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STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Nature of the Case
One evening last January, the Coeur d'Alene Police threatened to shelter Devin
Ray Bischoff's three-year-old son, whom they had found playing in the street by himself,
and insisted that Mr. Bischoff allow the police to search his home. After purportedly
obtaining Mr. Bischoff's consent, the police found drugs and paraphernalia in
Mr. Bischoff's home. Mr. Bischoff moved to suppress the evidence seized during that
warrantless search, and the district court denied the motion.

Mr. Bischoff then pied

guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor injury to a child,
but preserved his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
on appeal.
The district court erred by denying Mr. Bischoff's motion to suppress evidence
seized during the warrantless search of his home. Mr. Bischoff did not consent to that
search, and the officer's threats to shelter Mr. Bischoff's son rendered any alleged
consent involuntarily.

This Court should vacate Mr. Bischoff's convictions for

possession of a controlled substance and injury to a child and reverse the order denying
his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On January 29, 2014, Mr. Bischoff was working on his truck in the parking lot of a
motel where he was living temporarily with his wife, Sheena Freeman, and their threeyear-old son, R.B.

(7/14/2014 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.2; Transcription of the Audio

Tape from January 29, 2014 ("1/29/2014 Tr."), 1 p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.25.) Mr. Bischoff

The January 29, 2014 recording was taken by Officer Schmitz's body camera during
this incident. The district court admitted the recording itself into evidence as Defendant's
1

1

had left R.B. inside while he tried to fix the family truck, the only vehicle the family
owned. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-19.) Shortly after Mr. Bischoff put R.8. inside, Officer
Jacob Nielson of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department approached Mr. Bischoff.
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.7, Ls.18-19; 3/4/20·14 Tr.,2 p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.1.) Officer Nielson and
another officer, Officer Johann Schmitz, had responded to a welfare check and had
found R.B. playing in the street with the family dog. (3/4/2014 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p. 7, L.1.)
In the meantime, Officer Schmitz, with R.B. in tow, went and knocked on the door
of Mr. Bischoff's unit. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.9, L.1 -- p.10, L.2; 1/29/2014 Tr., p.3, L.4 - p.4,
L.25.) When no one answered, Officer Schmitz requested that two more officers come
to the scene, left R.B. with those officers, and went to the parking lot where Officer
Nielson was talking with Mr. Bischoff. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.5, L.22--p.6, L.15.)
Mr. Bischoff told the officers that he had put R.B. inside just five to ten minutes
earlier so that he could work on the family truck, but Officer Schmitz would not have it.
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.6, L.16
Officer Schmitz began

p. 7, L.19.) Just after first making contact with Mr. Bischoff,
aggressively interrogating and

threatening

Mr. Bischoff.

(7/14/2014 Tr., Exhibit A 3 .) Officer Schmitz repeatedly asked Mr. Bischoff whether there
were any drugs in his home and threatened to shelter R.B.:
Officer Schmitz: So you need to explain to me why I shouldn't shelter your
kid to make sure that you're a qualified parent and your wife is a qualified
parent. Can you do that?
Exhibit A to the 7/14/2014 suppression hearing ("7/14/2014 Tr., Exhibit A"). The district
court admitted the transcript of the recording as Exhibit B at the suppression hearing.
That transcript is included in the electronic document entitled "Devin Bischoff (Exhibits)
#42574." Citations to the January 29, 2014, transcript refer to the page numbers that
appear at the bottom of each page and not the pages of the electronic document.
2 Citations to the March 3, 2014, preliminary hearing transcript refer to the page
numbers which appear at the bottom of each page and not the pages of the electronic
document.
3 Mr. Bischoff invites the court to listen to the audio tape as it captures Officer Schmitz's
tone.
2

Mr. Bischoff: Yeah.
Officer Schmitz: Well, start talking.
Mr. Bischoff: I just-this is--1 got to get it going.
Officer Schmitz: So I understand you got to get it going. Do you have any
friends or anyone else you can call?
Mr. Bischoff: No. I'm not going to work on it no more tonight.
Officer Schmitz:

Ok.

But getting it _going and leaving--how old--is it

Mr. Bischoff:

Officer Schmitz: How old is

Mr. Bischoff: Three.
Officer Schmitz: Three. Do you thin
apartment by himself while you're out

is capable of staying in an
king on this car?

Mr. Bischoff: No.
Officer Schmitz: I don't think so.
Mr. Bischoff: I wasn't thinking, so ...
Officer Schmitz: Are you using or anything?
Mr. Bischoff: No.
Officer Schmitz: Is there anything in your apartment?
Mr. Bischoff: Nope.
Officer Schmitz: You give my partner permission to look in your apartment
and go through it?
Mr. Bischoff: Not without my wife.
Officer Schmitz: Why not?
Mr. Bischoff: I just3

Officer Schmitz: You think it's a good enough place for a three-year-old to
be by yourself [sic] but not a good enough place to let my partner look
through it?
Mr. Bischoff: No, not here in the apartment.
Officer Schmitz: Huh?
Mr. Bischoff: Not in the apartment. We're getting ready to move.
Officer Schmitz: Okay. No, the question was: You thought it was safe to
leave your three-year-old son unattended in your apartment, right?
Mr. Bischoff: (Inaudible) safe.
Officer Schmitz: Well, you didn't think it was safe, but you did that anyway

Mr. Bischoff: Yeah.
Officer Schmitz: -while you worked on your truck, okay. Your truck
that's over here and your apartment is No. 17, correct? On the kittycorner to where you are, where you have no idea who's coming and
going; including your son who went out into the street.
Mr. Bischoff: I feel pretty low right now.
Officer Schmitz: You should feel pretty low. So my question for you is if
you think it's okay for your son to be in that apartment, why is it not okay
for my partner to go in and see if there's anything dangerous there?
Mr. Bischoff: There's nothing dangerous.
Officer Schmitz: So why can we not go in and look around? You got a
bong or somethin' like that? I don't care about bongs and marijuana,
dude, I really don't. Is that what's in there? Is that it?
Mr. Bischoff: Yeah.
Officer Schmitz: Is there anything else in there? Other than-what, is it a
bong? A little bit of personal use stuff?
Mr. Bischoff: Yeah.
Officer Schmitz: Well, no, I appreciate the honesty, but you need to be
100 percent honest with me because I'm this close to sheltering your kid.
Okay. It's dark, this is about the shittiest part of town you can get in and
you4

Mr. Bischoff: (inaudible) here before.
Officer Schmitz: Okay. Well, how long have you been in this motel?
Mr. Bischoff: Two, three weeks.
Officer Schmitz: Where is your wife right now?
Mr. Bischoff: At work.
Officer Schmitz: Where does she work?
Mr. Bischoff: Right up the road.
Officer Schmitz: Don't tell me right up the road.
works.

You know where she

Mr. Bischoff: Ambitions.
Officer Schmitz: Ambitions?
Mr. Bischoff: Yeah, up the street.

Officer Schmitz: What's that?
Mr. Bischoff: Caregiving.

Officer Schmitz: You going to let my partner go in and get that bong? I'm
not going to have a bong or a pipe around with the three-year-old kid.
Mr. Bischoff: Okay.
Officer Schmitz: Does he have permission to go in? 4 I'll talk to your wife
too. What's her name?

Mr. Bischoff did not verbally respond to that question, and Officer Schmitz did not
recall that Mr. Bischoff responded nonverbally to that question. (3/4/2014 Tr., p.62, L.13
- p.63, L.17 (Officer Schmitz testifying at the suppression hearing that "[t]here was
something that Mr. Bischoff did, either verbal or a gesture" that made him think
Mr. Bischoff had consented to the search, but that Officer Schmitz could not recall what
that was), p.66, Ls.1-4 (Officer Schmitz confirming that his report never mentioned any
gestures made by Mr. Bischoff).)
4
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Officer Schmitz: Okay. What's she going to do when I call her and tell her
I found your kid on the street?
Mr. Bischoff: (inaudible)
Officer Schmitz: She's going to flip out on you, isn't she? Because I'm not
going to leave him with you, man.
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.8, L.1 - p:12, L.19 (footnote and emphasis added); see also 7/14/20·14
Tr., Exhibit A.)
Officer Schmitz then instructed Officer Nielson, "don't go in there yet," and called
Ms. Freeman. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.12, L.23.) Officer Schmitz asked Ms. Freeman whether
he could "go in there and make sure there's [sic] not knives and guns laying around."
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, Ls.9--11.) When Ms. Freeman asked whether Mr. Bischoff had
consented to the search, Officer Schmitz told her that Mr. Bischoff "said it was fine with
him."

(1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, L.19.)

Only after Officer Schmitz represented that

Mr. Bischoff consented to the search did Ms. Freeman give her consent to the search.
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, L.21.)
Officer Nielson then searched the unit and found a pipe he believed was used to
smoke methamphetamine. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.17, Ls.15-18.) Officer Schmitz continued
using R.B. to prod more information out of Mr. Bischoff: "Where's the rest of the meth?
Be honest with me, man. Honesty is going to go a lot further in my report and keep you
from losing your kid permanently." (1/29/2014 Tr., p.18, Ls.19-21.)
Officer Nielson uncovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and additional pipes
during his search (1/29/2014 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.26, L.2; 3/4/2014 Tr., p.7, L.12 - p.8,
L.1.) Officer Schmitz then arrested Mr. Bischoff for felony possession of a controlled
substance.

(1/29/2014 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-16).

After Officer Schmitz handcuffed

Mr. Bischoff, Mr. Bischoff offered to tell Officer Schmitz from whom he bought the
6

methamphetamine.
Mr. Bischoff:

(1/29/2014 Tr., p 24, L.2 -- p.25, L.7.)

Officer Schmitz asked

"Is it the same guy you've been getting the stuff from?"

(1/29/2014

Tr., p.25, Ls.8--9.) Only after Officer Schmitz placed Mr. Bischoff in his patrol car did
Officer Schmitz inform Mr. Bischoff of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); (1/29/2014 Tr., p.28, Ls.5-10.)
Mr. Bischoff moved to suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless
search of his home.

He argued that he never consented to the search and that any

alleged consent was involuntary because Officer Schmitz threatened to shelter R.B. and
the officers had not read Mr. Bischoff his Miranda rights. The district court denied the
motion. The court found that Mr. Bischoff consented to the search when he said "okay"
after Officer Schmitz said, "[a]re you going to let my partner go in and get that bong?
I'm not going to have a bong or pipe around a three year old." (7/14/2014 Tr., p.53,
L.21 - p.54, L.2.) And although the court acknowledged that Officer Schmitz's threat of
sheltering R.B. made the question of voluntariness a close one, it found that those
threats were not coercive because the police in fact could have sheltered R.B.
(7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.10 - p.58, L.23.) Finally, the court found that Mr. Bischoff was
not in custody and therefore the police did not need to give him a Miranda warning.
(7/14/2014 Tr., p.58, L.24 - p.59, L.8.)
After the district court denied the motion, Mr. Bischoff entered a conditional guilty
plea to felony possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor injury to a child.
(7/18/2014 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-23.) For the possession charge, the district court sentenced
Mr. Bischoff to three years, with one and one-half years fixed, suspended the sentence,
and placed Mr. Bischoff on probation.

(9/17/2014 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-24.)

7

The court

sentencGd Mr. Bischoff to thirty days on the sl1eriff's labor progr;Jm for injury to a child.
(9/17/20"14 Tr., p.27, Ls.3--7.)

8

~_SUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bischoff's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bischoff's Motion To Suppress
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ID. CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches are

presumptively unreasonable, unless the State proves that the search falls within a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973); State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). A search conducted with

consent is one exception to the warrant requirement.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219;

State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 74 7 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The State must prove both that the

defendant gave consent to search and that he gave that consent voluntarily.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222; State v. Garcia, ·143 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2006). The

Court must exclude evidence discovered during an unlawful search as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree."

Wong Sun v. United States, 37·1 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); see also

State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519 (2012).

The State has failed to prove that Mr. Bischoff consented to the search of his
apartment and that the consent Mr. Bischoff purportedly gave was voluntary.

The

district court therefore erred by denying Mr. Bischoff's motion to suppress the evidence
seized during the warrantless search of his home.

A.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a motion to suppress, the Court defers to the district court's

factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review over questions of
statutory construction and the district court's application of constitutional principles in
light of the facts found.

State v.

Thiel, No. 41811, 2015 WL 847493, at *2

(Idaho Feb. 27, 2015); State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470 (2001 ). Factual findings are
10

clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct App. 2011 ).

B.

The State Has Failed To Prove That Mr. Bischoff Consented To The Search Of
His Home
When the State claims that the consent exception applies to a warrantless

search of a home, the State has the heavy burden to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant consented to the search.

Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (explaining that the "physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed") (internal quotation
marks omitted); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695 (Ct App. 1999); see also State v.
f-fa/1, 132 Idaho 751, 753 (1999) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protection

against unreasonable searches and seizures in a defendant's home "extends to a
temporary home such as a motel room.").

Consent to search may be in the form of

words, gestures, or conduct, Staatz, 132 Idaho at 695 (citing State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho
343, 348 (Ct App. 1991 )), but must be "unequivocal and specific," United States v.
Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597, 602 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007). "When consent to enter and search a

home must be inferred, the burden on the state of proving consent is 'heaviest."' Staatz,
132 Idaho at 695 (quoting Shaibu, 920 F .2d at 1426).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court considered two
statements which the State argued amounted to consent by Mr. Bischoff: "[T]he first
request was for permission to search, and the answer was, 'Not without my wife.'
Second he was asked, 'Are you going to let my partner go in and get that bong? I'm not

11

going to have a bong or pipe around a three year old.'

[Mr. Bischoff] answered,

'[o]kay."' (7/14/2014 Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.54, L.2.) The district court then stated: "I think
that my reading of the language used on the tape and in the transcript is that at that
point Mr. Bischoff did give consent. That was the way that it would be interpreted, I
think, by the officer, and I think that was a reasonable interpretGtion."

(7/'14/2014

Tr., p.54, Ls.3-7.) That finding-----that Mr. Bischoff consented to a search of his home
when he said "okay"-is unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. 5 In fact,
the evidence in the record flatly contradicts that finding. Because the district court erred
by concluding that Mr. Bischoff consented, the Court should reverse that finding.
As an initial matter, Mr. Bischoff responded "okay'' to a question followed by an
assertion.

(1/29/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-20.)

Mr. Bischoff could have meant to

communicate "okay, I give my consent to search" or "okay, I understand you will not
have a bong around a three year old."

More importantly, the term "okay" does not

unequivocally communicate "yes." See Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426. It is commonly used
to merely acknowledge something that someone has said, without either agreeing or
disagreeing. In fact, Officer Schmitz himself said "okay" approximately 27 times during

5

Mr. Bischoff maintains that, consistent with the district court's findings, his earlier
statement of "not without my wife" did not give consent to search. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.9,
Ls.3-5; 7/14/2014 Tr., p.54, Ls.3-7.) That statement did not clearly communicate
whether Mr. Bischoff wanted his wife to be present, whether he wanted to speak with
his wife, or whether he wanted his wife to consent to the search as well. Nor did the
officers interpret that statement as giving consent because the officers continued to ask
Mr. Bischoff for consent after Mr. Bischoff said "not without my wife." (1/29/2014
Tr., p.11, Ls.17-20.) Moreover, Ms. Freeman's "consent" could not have authorized the
search.
Mr. Bischoff, who was the only physically-present co-occupant, never
consented to the search. When a defendant who is physically present refuses to
consent to a search, another co-occupant's consent is not valid as to the defendant.
See Georgia v. Randoph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006); Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct.
1126, 1130 (2014). And Ms. Freeman's consent-which she gave only after Officer
Schmitz incorrectly told that Mr. Bischoff "said it was fine with him"-is invalid.
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-22.)
12

his interrogation of Mr. Bischoff in response to assertions--not questions-made by
Mr. Bischoff. (See 1/29/2014 Tr.)
Further, the district court completely overlooked the fact that, after Mr. Bischoff
said "okay," Officer Schmitz again asked "does he have permission to go in?"
(1/29/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.20-21.) Officer Schmitz's follow-up question, which indicates
that Officer Schmitz himself did not understand Mr. Bischoff's "okay" to communicate
consent, contradicts the district court's finding that it was "reasonable" for Officer
Schmitz to believe that Mr. Bischoff had consented when he said "okay." (7/14/2014
Tr., p.54, Ls.3--7 (stating that "[t]hat was the way that it would be interpreted, I think, by
the officer, and I think that was a reasonable interpretation.") (emphasis added).
Crucially, Mr. Bischoff did not verbally respond to that follow-up question, and Officer
Schmitz did not testify that Mr. Bischoff responded nonverbally to that question.
(3/4/2014 Tr., p.62, L.13 - p.63, L.17 (Officer Schmitz testifying that "[t]here was
something that Mr. Bischoff did that night, either verbal or a gesture" that made him
think Mr. Bischoff had consented to the search, but that Officer Schmitz could not recall
what that was), p.67, Ls.1-4 (Officer Schmitz confirming that his written report never
mentioned any gestures made by Mr. Bischoff.)
Finally, Officer Schmitz's naked assertion that he had consent, without being able
to say why, falls far short of the State's heavy burden to affirmatively prove unequivocal
and specific consent to search Mr. Bischoff's home. For example, the Idaho Court of
Appeals in Staatz found that the State had failed to meet its burden where "[t]he only
evidence presented by the state to meet its burden was a 'yes' answer to the question
whether the officers were 'let' into the home by Mary," the defendant's wife. 132 Idaho
at 696. The Court of Appeals reasoned: "[T]his one-word answer to a question phrased
13

in a conclusory fashion provided no evidentiary facts ::is to what occurred.

The

testimony does not disclose what the officers said to Mary or what she said to them
before they entered, nor does it describe any act or gesture by Mary that might be
interpreted as an expression of consent." Id. (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals
was thus "constrained to hold that, as a rnatter of law, the evidence elicited regarding
the initial entry into the residence was insufficient to satisfy the state's burden .... " Id.
Similarly here, the State has presented no evidence that Mr. Bischoff assented when
Officer Schmitz asked the follow up-question-"[d]oes he have permission to go in?"
(1/29/2014 Tr., p:11, L.21.)

The recording from Officer Schmitz's body camera

unequivocally proves that Mr. Bischoff did not verbally assent to that question
(1/29i2014 Tr., p.1 ·1, Ls.20-23; 7/14/2014 Tr., Exhibit A), and Officer Schmitz did not
document nor could he specifically recall any gesture or act that would have indicated
an expression of consent (3/4/2014 Tr., p.62, L.13 - p.63, L.17, p.67, Ls.1-4).
In short, the State has failed to meet its burden of showing unequivocal and
specific consent. The district court erred by finding that Mr. Bischoff consented to the
search of his home, and the court should have suppressed the evidence seized as a
result. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Koivu, 152 Idaho at 519.

C.

Even If Mr. Bischoff Consented To The Search, The State Has Failed To Prove
That Mr. Bischoff Consented Voluntarily
"Where there is coercion there cannot be consent."

391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).

Bumper v. N. Carolina,

"For no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the

resulting 'consent' would be no more than a mere pretext for the unjustified police
intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
228. Voluntary consent is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice,"
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while consent granted when a defendant's "will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired" is involuntary.

Id. at 225.

does not constitute knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent.

Mere acquiescence
Bumper, 391 U.S. at

54f3-49; State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98 (Ct. App. 2006).
Whether consent was the product of coercion is a factual determination.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.

"The state has a heavy burden to prove that consent

was given freely and voluntarily," State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 536 (Ct. App. 2000),
and that it was not "coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert
force," Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
At the suppression hearing, the court discussed what it considered to be the two
primary factors that Mr. Bischoff has raised to show involuntariness--the presence of
four police officers and the threats to shelter R.B. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.54, Ls:18-19.) The
court found that the presence of the police officers was not particularly coercive
because Mr. Bischoff only ever interacted with two officers. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.54, L.19 p.55, L.1.) While noting that the Officer's threats to take R.B. away was "[t]he more
important issue" and was "a closer question," the court found that that Officer Schmitz's
threats of sheltering R.B. were not coercive because the police in fact could have
sheltered R.B. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.10 - p.58, L.23.)

The district court found

Mr. Bischoff's alleged consent to be voluntary.
The court erroneously concluded that Mr. Bischoff voluntarily gave Officer
Schmitz consent to search his home.

First, assuming that Mr. Bischoff's "okay"

amounted to consent to search, Mr. Bischoff only gave that consent because of the
immensely coercive circumstances surrounding Mr. Bischoff's interaction with Officer
Schmitz. Most crucially, Officer Schmitz at the very least implied that he would shelter
15

Mr. Bischoff's son unless Mr. Bischoff was honest with the police and consented to a
search.

Second, because the police had no lawful authority to shelter Mr. Bischoff's

son, those threats rendered Mr. Bischoff's alleged consent involuntary.

1.

The Circumstances Under Which Mr. Bischoff Purportedly Gave
Consent-Particularly Officer Schmitz's Threats To Shelter R.B.-Were
Inherently Coercive

To determine whether a defendant voluntarily gave consent, the court must
assess "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation"-including "subtly coercive" police tactics,
the psychological impact on the defendant, and the defendant's potentially "vulnerable
subjective state ... " Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 229; see also Garcia, 143 Idaho at
778.

Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, "(1) whether Miranda warnings

were given; (2) the youth of the accused; (3) the accused's level of education or low
intelligence; (4) the length of the detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; and (6) deprivation of food or sleep."

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226;

Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778 (considering whether the defendant knew he could deny
consent; the location, conditions, and time at which the consent was given; whether the
defendant was free to leave; the number of officers involved; and the lack of any advice
to the defendant regarding his constitutional rights).

"Because each factual situation

surrounding consent to a search is unique, [the Court] may also take into account any
other factors that [it] deem[s] relevant."

Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1082

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir.
2004) (in which the court considered police threats to take away the defendant's
children in determining whether consent was coerced or voluntary)).
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'The relationship

between

fundamental value of our society."
(9th Cir. 1981 ).

parent and

child

embodies a primordial and

United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336

When law enforcement officers deliberately prey upon a parent by

inculcating fear that the parent will not see his child in order to elicit "cooperation," the
law enforcement officers exert improper influence over the parent. Id. (finding that an
officer's threats that the defendant "might not see her two-year-old child for a while"
contributed to the involuntariness of the defendant's consent); see also Lynumn v.

Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (finding a confession involuntary when the police told
the defendant that her children would be taken from her if she did not cooperate);

United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1994) (in which the police's
"manifestly improper" behavior of threatening to take the defendant's child away
rendered his consent involuntary).
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the circumstances surrounding
Mr. Bischoff's purported consent were immensely coercive. 6 Officer Nielson and Officer
Schmitz approached Mr. Bischoff in a motel parking lot after dark. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.10,
Ls.21-23, p.4, L.15.) Mr. Bischoff was leaning up against his truck during much of the
interaction, with the police standing in front and on either side of him, one about four or
five feet away and the other about eight to ten feet away.

(7/14/2014 Tr., p.24, L.22

p.23, l.10.) From the get-go, Officer Schmitz put his authority over Mr. Bischoff on high
display.

Officer Schmitz spoke in an aggressive, threatening manner.

6

(7/14/2014

The district court did not explicitly decide whether Officer Schmitz's threats, along with
the totality of the circumstances, would have been sufficiently coercive to render
Mr. Bischoff's alleged consent involuntary if Officer Schmitz in fact did not have the
lawful authority to shelter R.B. (See 7/14/2014 Tr., p.50, L.19 - p.59, L.9.) Mr. Bischoff
contends, however, that this Court can make that determination on the record before it
without remanding to the district court. If the Court disagrees, Mr. Bischoff asks that the
Court remand to the district court to make additional factual findings.
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Tr., Exhibit A.) Aijer exchanging just a few words with Mr. Bischoff, Officer Schmitz told
Mr. Bischoff, "you need to explain to me why I shouldn't shelter your kid to make sure
that you're a qualified parent and your wife is a qualified parent," and then asked "are
you using or anything?"

(1/29/2014 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-4, p.8, L.24.) Mr. Bischoff was not

free to leave because the police had his son. The officers did not inform Mr. Bischoff
that he had a right to refuse consent, nor did they give him Miranda warnings. 7

(See 1/29/2014 Tr.; 7/14/2014 Tr., p.27, L.11 - p.28, L.14.)
Even setting aside the above considerations, Officer Schmitz's attempt to garner
Mr. Bischoff's consent by threatening to take away his three-year-old child renders

Mr. Bischoff's consent involuntary. The magnitude of that threat-reaching to the heart
of "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests"-cannot be overstated.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Officer Schmitz made it abundantly clear
that Mr. Bischoff had a choice-either Mr. Bischoff would cooperate with the officers or
he would risk losing his sane.

(1/29/2014 Tr., p.8, L.1 - p.11, L.20 (Officer Schmitz

stating: "So you need to explain to me why I shouldn't shelter your kid to make sure
that you're a qualified parent and your wife is a qualified parent."), p.10, Ls.19-21
(Officer Schmitz telling Mr. Bischoff:

"[Y]ou need to be 100 percent honest with me

because I'm this close to sheltering your kid.").) Officer Schmitz also told Mr. Bischoff
that if Mr. Bischoff's home was safe for a child, Mr. Bischoff would have no reason to

refuse to allow an officer take a look around.
Schmitz stating:

(1/29/2014 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-10 (Officer

"You think it's a good enough place for a three-year-old to be by

yourself [sic] but not a good enough place to let my partner look through it?"), p.10,

7

Officer Schmitz gave Mr. Bischoff Miranda warnings later on, after Officer Schmitz
arrested Mr. Bischoff and placed him in a patrol car. (1/29/2014 Tr., p.23, L.8 - p.28,
L.14; 7/14/2014 Tr., p.28, Ls.15-23.)
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Ls.4-8 (Officer Schmitz reiterating:

"[l]f you think it's okay for your son to be in that

apartment, why is it not okay for my partner to go in and see if there's anything
dangerous there.").)

Officer Schmitz's threats to take R.B. away unless Mr. Bischoff

cooperated were inherently coercive.

2.

Officer Schmitz Had No Lawful Authority To Shelter R.B., And So His
Threats Rendered Mr. Bischoff's Purported Consent Involuntary

"[V]oluntariness of consent is not impaired simply because one is faced with two
unpleasant choices," so long as the officer has the legal authority to do what he
threatens. Garcia, 143 Idaho at 779; State v. Abeyta, ·131 Idaho 704, 708-09 (Ct. App.
1998) (police threats to obtain a warrant if defendant did not consent to a search did not
render consent involuntary where police cou!d have legally obtained a search warrant).
But when consent is based on an officer's threats that are unsupported by any legal
authority, the consent is invalid.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233 (stating that consent

"granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority" is invalid); Bumper, 391 U.S.
at 549-50; (finding consent involuntary because the officer requesting consent
represented that he had a search warrant, when in fact he did not).
"The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been
model parents .... " Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Troxell v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). Indeed, the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution allows the government to intervene in a parent's relationship with his
child, without first providing due process, only if the child is "threatened with imminent
harm when it is justified by emergency circumstances." Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286,
1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (surveying cases from the U.S. Circuit Courts); Mueller v. Aucker,
19

700 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2012). Idaho law reflects this standard by providing that
law enforcement may shelter a child without first obtaining a court order "only where the
child is endangered in his surroundings and prompt removal is necessary to prevent
serious physical or mental injury to the child ... "

Idaho Code § 16-1608(1)(a)

(emphasis added); see also Matter of X, 110 Idaho 44, 45 (1986) (in which a police
detective temporarily took X, a four-year-old girl, from her parents' care because various
interviews done of X by a doctor and social worker led them to believe her parents had
sexually abused her); Mueller, 700 F.3d at 1187-1188 (approving, in the qualified
immunity context, an Idaho detective's decision that an infant was in imminent danger
warranting emergency removal because doctors had diagnosed her with life-threatening
meningitis and her parents refused to get her medical treatment).
Here, the district court erroneously dismissed Officer Schmitz's threats as based
on Officer Schmitz's lawful authority. The court reasoned:
The more important issue, I think is the discussion about the sonthe defendant's son being taken from him. I think this is a closer question.
However, a review of the transcript shows me that the way this was
presented was always phrased in doing what was in the best interests of
the child.
I think the context has to be considered. Here the officers find a
three-year-old child in the middle of the street in the middle of the winter
with no one anywhere in the home or nearby to take care of him. It seems
to me that it's entirely reasonable for the officers to want to inspect the
residence for the welfare of the child and reasonable for the officers to
inform the defendant that, absent their ability to do so, the child could be
placed in protective custody. I think it would have been unreasonable-or
it could have been viewed as not proper police procedure for the officers
to do anything else. For example, finding a kid in the street like that and
returning him to the residence without checking to make sure that there
was not a reason to worry about his future welfare.
The defendant was obviously faced with a choice. He chose to
consent. But here the officers did not falsely represent anything to the
defendant. Idaho Code [§] 16-1608 authorizes a child to be sheltered if
he is in danger.

20

... The officers only informed Mr. Bischoff of what the law aIfowed them to
do. Accordingly, the discussion about the defendant's son being taken
away from him did not render his consent involuntary as a result of
coercion.

(7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.10 - p.58, L.23 (emphasis added).)
Respectfully, it is not law enforcement's duty, much less its right, to determine
what is in "the best interests of [a] child." (7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, L.15.) That fundamental
right is vested in a child's parents, and the government may only usurp that right if the
child is in "imminent danger," Mueller, 700 F.3d at 1187, or, put another way, if "the child
is endangered in his surroundings and prompt removal is necessary to prevent serious
physical or mental injury," I.C. § 16-1608(1)(a). The district court therefore erred by
concluding that I.C. § 16--1608(1)(a) "authorizes the child to be sheltered if he is in
danger" (7/14/2014 Tr., p.56, Ls.9-10), and by consequently finding that the officers had
the authority to shelter R.B. under I.C. § 16-1608(1 )(a), (7/14/2014 Tr., p.58, Ls.20-21 ).
Further, R.B. was not in danger of serious injury such that prompt removal from
his parents' care and custody was necessary. As an initial matter, I.C. § 16-1608(1 )(a)
is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.

The only evidence supporting

emergency removal was the fact that the police found R.B. playing in the street. Before
the police spoke with Mr. Bischoff, they had no way of knowing how R.B. ended up in
the street or whether R.8. was under the care of a parent or someone else. The police
therefore had no reason to believe that R.B. was so endangered in the care of his
parents that R.B. would face serious injury unless promptly removed from his parents'
custody without first obtaining a court order.
Even after the police learned that Mr. Bischoff had left R.B. alone inside so that
Mr. Bischoff could fix his truck, Mr. Bischoff's poor judgment could not warrant
emergency removal-taking R.B. from his parents' care and custody without a court
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order. AgDin, I.C. § 16-1608C1 )(a) requires that "prompt" removal from a child's home
or guardian be "necessary" to prevent "serious injury."

For example, in Matter of X,

11 O Idaho at 45, Idaho Health and Welfare took a four-year-old girl from her parents
because a doctor and social worker believed, after various interviews, that the girl's
parents sexually abused her. Similarly, the court in Mueller, 700 F.3d at

n 87-1188,

approved of a detective's decision to shelter an infant because doctors had diagnosed
her with life-threatening meningitis and her parents refused to get her medical
treatment. Here, the only danger that R.8. faced was no longer a threat once the police
removed R.B. from the street.

And there was no indication that, aside from

Mr. Bischoff's poor judgment to leave R.B. by himself in his home, Mr. Bischoff posed
any danger to R.B., let alone a danger requiring prompt removal. Although Mr. Bischoff
undoubtedly made a poor decision when he left RB. inside alone, that mistake is not so
severe to permit law enforcement to take R.B. from Mr. Bischoff's care without a court
order.
Further, Officer Schmitz's own actions show that Officer Schmitz did not have
grounds to take RB. Officer Schmitz explained at the suppression hearing that "[m]y
desire to go in the home was to find out whether or not it was safe as one of the factors
in deciding whether or not his son was going to get sheltered ... " (7/14/2014 Tr., p.26,
Ls.19-22.) Yet Officer Schmitz used his threats to shelter R.B. to garner Mr. Bischoff's
consent. This is the quintessential problem of the chicken and the egg: Officer Schmitz
needed to look in Mr. Bischoff's home in order to determine whether R.B. was
"endangered in his surroundings" such that prompt removal without a court order was
necessary; but, at the same time, Officer Schmitz used the threat of sheltering R.B. in

order to look inside. This problem is echoed in the district court's decision that it was
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reasonable for the officers to inform the defendant that, "absent their ability'' to inspect
the residence, R.B could be placed in protective custody. (7/14/2014 Tr., p.55, Ls.2024) (emphasis added.)
The district court erroneously found that Officer Schmitz had legal cause under
I.C. § 16--1608(1)(a) to take R.B. from his parents without a court order.

Although

Mr. Bischoff undoubtedly made a poor decision to leave R.B. unattended, that mistake
alone could not trigger emergency removal under I.C. § 16-1608(1)(a) because R.B.
was never endangered in his surroundings such that promptly removing R.B. from his
parents' care was necessary to prevent serious injury. The district court erred by finding
as much.

Because Officer Schmitz had no legal authority to shelter R.B., his hollow

threats rendered Mr. Bischoff's purported consent involuntary. The district court should
have suppressed the evidence seized during the warrantless search of Mr. Bischoff's
home. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Koivu, 152 Idaho at 519.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Bischoff respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and reverse thG district court's order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 2yth day of April, 2015.

MAYA Ff: WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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